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Abstract 
In commercial grids, Grid Service Providers (GSPs) can improve their profitability by maintaining the 
lowest possible amount of resources to meet client demand. Their goal is to maximize profits by optimizing 
resource planning. In order to achieve this goal, they require an estimate of the demand for their service, 
but collecting demand data is costly and difficult.  In this paper we develop an approach to building a proxy 
for demand, which we call a value profile. To construct a value profile, we use binary feedback from a 
collection of heterogeneous clients.  We show that this can be used as a proxy for a demand function that 
represents a client’s willingness-to-pay for grid resources. As with all binary feedback systems, clients may 
require incentives to provide feedback and deterrents to selfish behavior, such as misrepresenting their true 
preferences to obtain superior services at lower costs. We use credibility mechanisms to detect untruthful 
feedback and penalize insincere or biased clients. Finally, we use game theory to study how cooperation 
can emerge in this community of clients and GSPs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Grid computing systems are an ecosystem consisting of Grid Service Providers (GSPs) and clients.  GSPs 
are agents who control resources while clients are users of those resources. Generally, resources refer to 
CPU cycles, memory space, disk space, and network bandwidth. Fig. 1 illustrates a typical commercial grid 
environment
1
 (as opposed to grids based on voluntary resources) [1]. Many studies have modeled grid 
resource brokers, as summarized in Buyya [2]. In this paper, we only look at the interaction between clients 
and GSPs and ignore the role of brokers in order to simplify our analysis. We assume that a client sends a 
job based on his/her constraints (such as budget and preferred duration) directly to a GSP, who promises to 
provide a service to the client according to a service level agreement (SLA). After the job is completed, the 
GSP returns the result to the client along with the service charge. 
 
                                                        
1 A grid resource broker is an agent who finds GSPs for clients while a grid market directory contains a list of all GSPs 
within a market. 
 
Figure 1 -- Typical Commercial Grid environment 
 
GSPs can increase their profits by either increasing revenues or reducing costs. Increased revenues can 
be achieved through pricing strategies or by upgrading current services. We presume that an upgraded 
service attracts both new and current clients, which can boost revenues. This case usually occurs in busy 
GSPs that have high resource utilization. However, GSPs have to be careful not to overprovision, since 
resources might be idle for long periods of time. This raises the question of how many extra resources 
GSPs should acquire. 
Alternatively, GSPs improve their profitability by maintaining the lowest amount of resources to meet 
client demand. In this scenario, a GSP might decide to downgrade a service by reducing their computing 
resources. This case commonly happens in GSPs that have low resource utilization. The challenge is 
finding the lowest resource level that is required to satisfy clients. If GSPs downgrade their quality of 
service (QoS) too much, they might end up losing their existing clients. 
 Since QoS is an essential attribute of demand and cannot be measured until after it is consumed, it is 
difficult for GSPs to estimate client demand. To improve this situation, feedback models, which work as 
signaling tools, may be used [3]. With feedback models, clients are asked to rate the received services 
based on their level of satisfaction. Since clients have to use resources to provide feedback, they might not 
do so if they cannot clearly see a benefit in their contribution. Furthermore, clients have incentives to 
provide untruthful feedback
2
 since they (rationally) want to consume as many resources as possible at the 
lowest price possible. That is, they have an incentive to lie in order to receive better service even though 
they may already be satisfied with the current service. This leads to questions on how useful client 
feedback is and how truthful client feedback can be obtained. 
Most previous work concentrates on market-based resource allocation without the use of service value 
to grid clients [2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. The main theme of this paper is to develop an approach to build a value 
profile using feedback models for a group of heterogeneous grid clients that GSPs can use as a proxy for 
demand to plan their resources economically. The goals of this paper are to study how client demand can be 
estimated for services and how cooperation can emerge. By understanding the conditions that allow it to 
emerge, it may be possible to suggest the development of cooperation in a particular set of conditions and 
provide the development of a credibility-based binary feedback model for grid resource planning. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review theoretical frameworks used in this paper 
and we describe an approach to building a value profile. Sections 3-4 discuss clients’ incentives to 
cooperate. Section 5 presents simulation results and discussions. Finally, Section 6 offers our conclusions.  
                                                        
2 Untruthful feedback is a term used to describe a feedback received from insincere or biased clients. Insincere clients 
are clients who have an incentive to cheat. Biased clients are clients who have an incentive to provide an unfair rating. 
2. Value Profiles 
 
In this paper, a value profile is a proxy for a demand function that represents a client’s willingness-to-pay 
for grid resources. To construct a value profile that is useful to GSPs, we use binary feedback, which is a 
form of on-line reputation. We examine the prior research on binary feedback in this section and 
demonstrate a way in which binary feedback can be used to construct a value profile. 
2.1 Online-Reputation 
 
Online reputation mechanisms, also known as feedback systems, have emerged as a significant quality 
signal and control mechanisms in private e-markets such as eBay.com and Amazon.com [3,11].  The 
objective of reputation mechanisms is to encourage trust and cooperation in online trading communities. 
Reputation systems are designed to collect feedback information from individual traders’ prior behavior 
and publish it to communities as an individual feedback profile. The success of future transactions depends 
on how people behave today. Most studies [12,13,14] indicate that positive feedback increases the price 
and probability of sale while negative feedback decreases the price and probability of sale. 
2.2 Binary Feedback  
 
The binary feedback model is a mechanism where clients (buyers) can only rate past transactions as either 
“positive” (1) or “negative” (0). Positive ratings indicate that clients received high quality or satisfactory 
services (or goods), and negative ratings indicate that clients received low quality or unsatisfactory 
services. The summary of ratings is publicly available to all clients. As a result, clients know the quality of 
sellers (GSPs in our case) based on the summary of their most recent ratings [15].  
According to Dellarocas [11], quality can be divided into three categories: real quality (qr), advertised 
quality (qa), and estimated quality (qe). Real quality is unknown to clients in advance and can only be 
determined after consumption. Generally, clients prefer higher quality to lower quality, although their 
willingness to pay for extra quality varies. Advertised quality, controlled by GSPs, informs clients through 
advertising, and it may or may not reflect real quality. Estimated quality is based on the information that is 
collected from clients. Basically, clients assess the quality based upon the advertised quality and GSPs’ 
rating profile. 
This quality information can be used to calculate client satisfaction, which is the difference between 
real quality and estimated quality. A client decides whether to rate a transaction based on satisfaction (Sj). If 
the real utility exceeds the expected utility (Sj>0), the client should rate that transaction as positive.  On the 
other hand, if the real utility falls below some threshold (-j) of the expected utility (Sj-j), the client 
should rate that transaction as negative. Furthermore, if the client receives slightly poor but not terribly 
poor service (-j<Sj0), the client may not provide any feedback [11]. 
2.3 Value Profiles 
 
Since the demand function either for a client or for a group of clients is hard to obtain, most studies assume 
a utility function (which is also difficult to empirically determine) and use it to calculate the price that 
clients are willing to pay. In this paper, we assert that a feasible way to obtain the willingness to pay of 
clients is to use feedback mechanisms like the binary feedback model.  As discussed in Section 2.2, 
positive feedback implies that a client is satisfied with the received service in term of cost and time, so that 
(presumably) s/he is willing to pay for such service at a future time. Negative feedback implies that a client 
is unsatisfied with the received service, and s/he may not be willing to pay for such service again. As a 
result, we propose the use of binary feedback to deduce the willingness to pay of a collection of 
heterogeneous clients. 
We will show that this value profile represents the willingness to pay of clients at different prices so it 
can function as a proxy for a market demand function. To do this, we must first build a simple model of 
GSPs and clients. Using this model, we can show that a value profile behaves like a demand function and is 
useful for grid resource planning. Since they are economic actors, we refer to them as GSP agents and 
client agents. 
2.4 GSP Agents 
 
GSP agents provide services to clients based on a SLA. In each period, the agents announce an estimated 
service price to clients. The price varies based on the utilization of system, which we express as [16] 
 
 
 
 
The agents also announce an estimated computing time, which is the mean response time of the 
system. Table 1 provides notations and parameters of GSP agents. 
 
 
Table 1 -- Parameters and definitions 
 Symbol Description 
GSP   i GSP index 
 

p i
est
 Estimated price for computing a job in that period, which 
equals an estimated cost to the client 
 

ai  Constant for adjusting pricing range 
 

bi  Constant for adjusting pricing range 
 

 i  Average utilization of system i in that period 
Client   j Client index 
  Sj Service satisfaction of client j after his/her job is completed 
 j Constraint sensitivity of client j 
 

t j
p r e f e r r e d_ d u r a t i o n
 
Preferred duration for completing a job of client j 
 

tj
total _ computing
 
Total computing time for completing a job of client j 
 

% tj
computing
 
Percentage of the difference between the preferred duration 
and the total computing time for completing the job of client j 
 

cj
exp
 
Expected cost (job budget) for completing job of client j 
 

c j
real
 
Real cost for completing job of client j 
 

%Cj
computing
 
Percentage of the difference between the expected cost (job 
budget) and the real cost for completing the job of client j 
 FBj Binary feedback from client j 
 j QoS threshold of client j 
 
2.5 Client Agents 
 
Clients are usually satisfied when a job is completed within the budget and the preferred job duration. Thus, 
client satisfaction (Sj) can be calculated as the difference between the change in computing time and the 
change in computing cost, which we express as (see Table 1) 
 
 
where 
 
  
Unless otherwise specified, we assume that clients are truthful and cooperative. As we described in 
Section 2.2, after a service, each client gives binary feedback FBj based on his/her satisfaction, which is 
expressed as (see Table 1) 
 

FB j 
"1" if S j  0
"0" if S j   j
no rate if   j  S j  0





 
 
2.6 Assumptions and Justifications 
 
We make a number of simplifying assumptions in this paper so that we can focus on the proof of the 
concept. We will relax some of these assumptions in future research. First, we offer jobs to the grid from 
heterogeneous clients that have different constraints (budget and preferred duration). Clients will decide 
whether to submit a job based on the GSPs’ service announcements subject to their constraints, as 
summarized in Fig. 2. Then, we assume that each client has a different number of jobs to process and is 
able to submit only one job at a time. We also assume that all jobs are of the same size.  
We use a M/M/1 queuing system with First Come First Serve (FCFS) policy. Thus, the price is directly 
proportional to system utilization. This helps regulate demand by encouraging clients who have low 
budgets and long preferred durations to wait for an off-peak period. Like purchasing airline tickets
3
, we 
assume that prices will be fixed after GSPs and clients have an agreement; however, the completion time is 
uncertain. Thus, the estimated service cost is the same as the final cost (%C = 0). We also assume that 
there is no discount rate for clients when GSPs miss a preferred deadline. Moreover, we assume that the 
relationship between the GSP and the client exists in the context of a competitive market.  
To justify the concept of value profiles in Section 2.3, we ran preliminary tests
4
 to determine whether 
value profiles are consistent with demand theory. Table 2 summarizes the parameters used in the 
preliminary tests. The algorithm for this experiment is presented in Fig. 2. 
                                                        
3 When purchasing airline tickets, we pay a certain price but we do not know whether a flight will be delayed. 
4 We use Csim as the simulation tool. 
 
Figure 2 -- Algorithm design to evaluate value profile concept 
 
Table 2 -- Parameter values used to test the value profile concept 
 Parameter Value 
Environment NUM_CLIENTS 
Interarrival rate 
Service rate 
100 
0.6 jobs/min 
1.0 jobs/min 
Client Agents Budget 
Preferred duration 
No_of_jobs 
j 
j 
tretransmit 
Uniform (1, {10,20}) 
Uniform (1, {5,20}) 
Uniform (1, 50) 
0 
1.0 
1000 min 
GSP Agents ai 
bi 
pi (service price)
 
0 
0.1 
Vary based on system utilization 
 
 
Figure 3 -- Demand curves based on value profiles (a) max_budget = {10,20} and max_preferred duration 
= 5 (b) max_budget = {10,20} and max_preferred duration = 20. 
 
Fig. 3 shows the resulting value profiles. The curves clearly have the shape of typical demand 
functions since the number of jobs with positive feedback and the number of total jobs submitted to the 
system are inversely proportional to the service prices. Moreover, these curves shift up and to the right 
when clients increase their maximum budget or preferred duration (and vice versa). For example, at a price 
of 0.3, if they increase their budget from 10 to 20, the number of jobs with positive feedback and the 
number of total submitted jobs will increase from 451 to 770 and from 634 to 1035, respectively, as shown 
in Fig. 3(a). If they also increase their preferred duration from 5 to 20, the number of jobs with positive 
feedback and the number of submitted jobs will increase to 865 and 1123, respectively, as shown in Fig. 
3(b). If they fix their budget at 10 and increase their preferred duration from 5 to 20, the number of jobs 
with positive feedback will increase from 451 to 510, as shown in Fig. 3(b). These results indicate that 
when clients’ constraints change, value profiles can capture clients’ willingness-to-pay at different prices. 
This is consistent with demand theory.  
The results suggest that value profiles have the shape and characteristics of demand functions. 
Therefore, we conclude that binary feedback can be used to construct value profiles that represent clients’ 
willingness-to-pay for grid resources. For the rest of this paper, we will use value profiles as proxies for 
demand functions. We believe that the use of value profiles can assist GSPs in finding an economic 
equilibrium point to plan their resource base. 
3. Using Binary Feedback for Grid Resource Planning 
 
The objective of this section is to explore clients’ incentives related to the use of binary feedback. 
According to Dellarocas et al. [3], feedback contributions do not directly benefit the feedback providers, 
while other entities benefit more directly. Thus, individuals might have less of an economic incentive to 
provide feedback even if it is socially optimal for them to do so. 
 
3.1 Incentives to Cooperate 
 
Clients do not cooperate unless they receive some benefit from their contribution. In reputations on the 
popular Internet auction site eBay, eBayers receive benefits in their future trading. Even there, eBay 
persistently prompts transacting parties to leave feedback. In our study, GSPs ask clients to spend resources 
to provide feedback after they receive a result. If clients cannot clearly see benefits from providing 
feedback, they do not have any economic incentives to cooperate with GSPs. As a result, we require a 
mechanism to create an incentive for clients to cooperate.  
 People work hard when they think their effort will help them achieve outcomes that they value [17]. 
After providing feedback, clients will continue their contribution if they obtain noticeable benefits, which 
can be achieved through providing “selective incentives [18]” and by publishing “community activities 
[19]”. For selective incentives, GSPs have to treat feedback-providing clients better than non-feedback-
providing clients; for example, in terms of higher priority in queuing and better rate. For community 
activity, like eBay, GSPs can show their feedback profile to represent how they manage jobs according to 
the SLA negotiated with clients. 
3.2 Incentives to be Truthful 
 
Rationally, self-interested individuals want to maximize their own payoff without any concern for another’s 
payoff. In our case, clients prefer to consume as many resources as possible within their budgets. In the 
case of good service, although they may already be satisfied with the current service, they may still want a 
better service by lying to GSPs. If GSPs believe them, they will receive an upgraded service without any 
extra costs. On the other hand, in the case of bad service, clients can receive more benefits by claiming that 
the service is a lot worse than it actually is. Accordingly, they have an economic incentive to provide 
untruthful feedback. We assert that a feasible way to promote honesty in feedback models is to use 
credibility mechanisms. 
 The use of credibility mechanisms enables GSPs to detect and penalize insincere or biased clients. The 
idea is to ensure that sincere clients always receive more benefits than insincere or biased clients. 
Therefore, clients will fear penalties and will provide truthful feedback because of higher payoffs.  
3.3 Promoting a Truthful Feedback 
 
In this paper, we adopt the credibility mechanism that is proposed by Papaioannou and Stamoulis [20]. We 
assume that when clients decide to submit their job, it means that they are willing to pay that price and their 
preferred duration is greater than or equal to the estimated computing time (

tj
p r e f e r r e d_d u a t i o nes t i mat ed_comput i ng_t i me). Then, we assume that the estimated computing time can 
be used as the reference of clients’ preferred duration.  
 With this assumption, GSPs can detect and penalize insincere or biased clients by comparing the 
client’s preferred duration (

t j
p r e f e r r e d_ d u r a t i o n
 )
 
with the total computing time (

t j
total _computing ). GSPs usually 
expect to receive positive feedback if they can finish jobs within preferred durations, and vice versa. Thus, 
the expected feedback
5
 (

FB j
exp
) can be expressed as 
 
 
  
 If the received feedback does not meet the expectations of the GSP (

FBj
e xpFBj
r e c e i v e d), that feedback 
is considered to be untruthful and will be discarded. Moreover, that client’s job will be held for some 
periodof time (

t j
penalty
) before receiving next service.  The client will not be offered the opportunity to 
provide feedback after that job since it will certainly be negative  because of the longer computing time (

tj
g r e e d y_c o mp u t i n gtj
t o t a l_c o mp u t i n gtj
p e n a l t y).Feedback that matches expectations (

FBj
e xpFBj
r e c e i v e d) will be 
counted. This process continues until there are no new jobs.  We believe that the use of a credibility 
mechanism such as the one described can promote truthful feedback. The algorithm of this mechanism is 
provided in [22]. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Note that GSPs’ expected feedback function (

FB j
exp
) is not equivalent to clients’ feedback function (FBj) since 
clients may not provide any feedback when receiving slightly bad service (see Section 2.5). 
4. Analysis of Clients’ Incentives 
 
Given the clients’ incentives (discussed in Section 3), we now consider the interaction between clients and 
GSPs using game theory. In this paper, we use strategic games
6
, which are often used for non-cooperative 
games. The objectives of this section are to analyze the cooperation between a GSP (player I) and a client 
(player II), and determine whether the use of credibility mechanism can help the cooperation emerge. 
4.1 Individual Payoff 
 
Before starting game analysis, we have to define a payoff for each individual player. The key players are a 
GSP and a client. The profit (payoff) for a GSP is known as 
 
P = R - C 
 
where R is a revenue from providing a service to a client, and C is the cost of providing that service. We 
assume that a GSP always sets its revenue to cover its cost (R > C > 0). 
The payoff for a client is defined as 
P = Q - R 
 
where R is the service cost that the client has to pay, which is equivalent to the revenue R of the GSP. Q is 
the client’s perception of value, which decays exponentially with time; this represents the QoS that the 
client received from the GSP. Therefore, in this function, the value of Q is proportional to the difference 
between preferred duration and total computing time, which we express as 
 
 
 For each strategic combination, a payoff for each player is calculated from the difference between 
his/her payoff both before and after making such decision, which we express as 
 
 
4.2 Feedback Games 
 
We play feedback games by assuming that all players are rational and selfish, and that a client always 
provides feedback. Then, we assume that a GSP plans resources based on the received feedback. Therefore, 
a GSP will upgrade a service if a client reports a poor service, and vice versa.  Table 3 summarizes 
parameters used in these feedback games. 
 
Table 3 -- Feedback game parameters (R > C > 0 and 0 <  < k < 1) 
 Upgrade 
 
Downgrade 
 
Q Q = (1+)*Q Q = (1-)*Q 
R R = (1+k)*R R =R 
C C = (1+)*C C = (1-)*C 
 
                                                        
6 These games usually assume that both players move simultaneously, or that later movers do not have any information 
about the earlier players’ moves. 
In these games, we assume that a GSP has two resource planning strategies after receiving a client’s 
feedback: Trust or Don’t trust the feedback. Believing the feedback might result in services that are more 
costly to provide. A client also has to choose between providing Truthful and Untruthful feedback. 
Untruthful feedback gives an insincere client more benefits than truthful feedback. On the other hand, 
truthful feedback is more valuable than untruthful feedback to the GSP. A resource manager will disregard 
the client’s feedback if s/he knew that the client lied. Table 4 analyzes the game given that the client 
already receives good service; Table 5 offers an analysis based on the given that the client receives poor 
service. 
 
Table 4 -- Feedback game given good service 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Trust 
-ωQ 
ωC 
ωQ-kR 
kR- ωC 
 
Don’t trust 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Table 5 -- Feedback game given poor service 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
(badly poor, b>k>ω) 
 
Trust 
ωQ-kR 
kR- ωC 
bQ-kR 
kR-bC 
 
Don’t trust 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
In Tables 4-5, “Trust” strategy dominates7 “Don’t trust” strategy. Since both players are rational, the 
client realizes that the GSP always prefers to trust the received feedback
8
. Then, the client will provide 
untruthful feedback because of the higher payoff
9
. As a result, the rationality of both players leads to the 
conclusion that the client will provide untruthful feedback and the GSP will trust it. At this point, 
cooperation cannot emerge and the GSP requires a mechanism to detect an insincere client. 
4.3 Credibility-based Feedback Game 
 
What makes it possible for the cooperation to emerge is that both players have to meet each other again, 
recognize each other from the previous transaction, and recall how the other behaved last time [21]. The 
decision of players not only affects the outcome of the current move, but also influences future decisions of 
the players. This is called an iterated game. 
Using the credibility mechanism, the GSP checks whether the received feedback is truthful by 
comparing it with their performance record. This mechanism allows the GSP to penalize the insincere 
client for previous non-cooperative play. This is similar to “Tit for tat” strategy10 in game theory. In such 
games, cooperation might arise as an equilibrium outcome. The incentive for client to defect is overcome 
by the threat of penalties, which leads to the possibility of a cooperative outcome. Consequently, we 
integrate the credibility mechanism into the feedback games. 
 
                                                        
7 Strategic dominance only occurs when one strategy gives higher payoff than another strategy for individual player, no 
matter how that player’s opponents would play. 
8 Given good and poor service, the resulting payoffs of ωC, kR-ωC, and kR-bC when cooperating (trust) are greater 
than zero when defecting (don’t trust), respectively. 
9 Given good service, the resulting payoff of –ωQ when cooperating (truthful) is less than ωQ-kR when defecting 
(untruthful). Likewise, given poor service, the resulting payoff of ωQ-kR when cooperating (truthful) is less than bQ-
kR when defecting (untruthful). 
10 A player using this strategy will initially cooperate, and then respond based on another player’s previous decision. 
  
Table 6 -- Credibility-based feedback game with good service 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Trust 
-ωQ 
ωC 
-Q 
0 
 
Don’t trust 
0 
0 
-Q 
0 
 
Table 7 -- Credibility-based feedback game with poor service 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Trust 
ωQ-kR 
kR- ωC 
-Q 
0 
 
Don’t trust 
0 
0 
-Q 
0 
 
In Tables 6-7, the “Truthful” strategy dominates the “Untruthful” strategy because of the credibility 
mechanism. Since both players are rational, the GSP realizes that the client is afraid of the penalty so the 
client will provide truthful feedback
11
. As a result, the rationality of both players leads to the conclusion 
that the client will provide truthful feedback and the GSP will trust it
12
. Cooperation succeeds at this point.  
In conclusion, the results show that the cooperation cannot emerge through the use of feedback alone; 
credibility mechanisms are required for cooperation to emerge. In this paper, we use credibility-based 
binary feedback [22] to build value profiles, which GSPs can use to optimally plan their resources. 
4.4 Effect of Untruthful Feedback Game 
 
According to our game analyses, clients are better off cooperating with GSPs when a credibility mechanism 
is used. However, the model cannot filter out all untruthful feedback because they receive limited 
information from clients. Thus, non-cooperative and untruthful clients still occur in two cases, as 
summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 -- The effect of untruthful feedback 
Client 
Satisfaction 
Expected 
Feedback 
Received 
Feedback  
 
Analysis 
(1) Sj  0 “+” “No rate” Non-cooperative / 
Untruthful 
(2) j  Sj < 0 “No rate” “-” Untruthful 
 
In the first case, clients might not respond because of noncooperation or being untruthful even though 
the GSP finished the job within the preferred duration and budget. In the second case, untruthful clients will 
provide negative feedback instead of no response when GSPs slightly fail to meet clients’ requirement. 
These two cases will affect value profiles and client satisfaction rates (or percentage of positive feedback) 
and might cause GSPs’ investment decisions to change.   
 
                                                        
11 Given good and poor service, the resulting payoffs of -ωQ and ωQ-kR when cooperating (truthful) are greater than –
Q when defecting (untruthful), respectively. 
12 Given good and poor service, the resulting payoffs of ωC and kR-ωC when cooperating (trust) are higher than zero 
when defecting (don’t trust), respectively.  
 5. Applying Value Profiles 
 
This section presents the results and discussions of the use of a credibility-based binary feedback model for 
grid resource planning. An economic equilibrium is required to test these questions. This equilibrium point 
can be determined by the intersection of cost function and market demand. Thus, we must construct a 
resource cost function and a proxy for market demand. 
5.1 Resource Cost Function 
 
Since the lifetime of investments in computing resources is substantially longer than demand fluctuations, 
we must consider the long-run production cost function. To generate a cost function, we begin by selecting 
six server systems from the TPC-C Benchmark [23]. In this paper, we assume that these six server systems 
represent six different scales of GSPs measured by the number of processors per GSP. Then, we determine 
a long-run average total cost (LATC) for one year, which is the sum of the short-run average total cost 
(SATC) of each GSP. The SATCi can be calculated as  
 
 
where the total cost of ownership (TCOi) is   
 
 
 
 
Table 9 -- One-year cost analysis of each GSP 
 
GSPi 
 
(1) 
tpmC 
(Transaction Rate) 
(2) = (1)/106 
Service Rate 
(jobs/min) 
(3) 
No. of Job 
Production (x103/yr) 
(4) 
TCOi 
(x103) 
GSP1 236,271 0.24 122 $190 
GSP2 404,462 0.40 210 $445 
GSP3 841,809 0.84 436 $939 
GSP4 1,245,516 1.25 646 $1,625 
GSP5 1,616,162 1.62 838 $1,795 
GSP6 2,196,268 2.20 1,139 $3,138 
 
By assuming that each job has 10
6
 transactions, Table 9 shows the one-year cost function for each 
GSP
13
.  The quadratic LATC function in Fig.4 is determined by performing a regression
14
, which can be 
expressed as 
 
 
                                                        
13 Due to the TPC-C Benchmark in Table 9, column (1) shows the computing capacity of each system. By assuming 
that each job has 106 transactions, column (2) shows the service rate of each system. With these values, we can 
calculate the number of job production in one year, as shown in column (3).  
14 We run the regression model based on the values in columns (3) and (4).  The statistical summary indicates that the 
cost function has a high coefficient of determination (R2=0.811) and a low significance level (Sig.=0.082). 
 
Figure 4 -- LATC curve for GSPs 
5.2 Market Demand 
 
We argued earlier that a value profile could function as a proxy for the demand function of an individual 
GSP, so the sum of each value profile can be used as a proxy for market demand
15
. By assuming that all 
value profiles are published, market demand can be expressed as 
 
 
 
In this paper, we use this market demand to represent the willingness to pay of all grid clients. 
Furthermore, since we assume that the market is a perfectly competitive market, normal profits
16
 only arise 
when the GSP’s long-run economic equilibrium is reached. Then, with the use of value profiles, the 
economic equilibrium can be determined by the intersection of the market demand curve and the LATC 
curve. 
5.3 Experimental Approach 
 
In these experiments, we assume that each client always provides feedback FBj based on their satisfaction 
level Sj which can be expressed as (see Table 1 for the summary of notations and parameters of client 
agents) 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 At any price, market demand is the sum of the quantities demanded by each individual’s demand. 
16 Normal profit is a zero economic profit (where revenue equals cost) since economic profit does not occur in a 
perfectly competitive market in long-run equilibrium regarding to the free entry and exit of GSPs. 

FB j 
"1" if S j  0 with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j  0 with (1 P(contribution))
"0" if S j   j with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j   j with (1 P(contribution))
"no rate" if   j  S j  0 with (1 P(untruthful))
"0" if   j  S j  0 with P(untruthful)











 
 
We believe that GSPs can increase clients’ incentives to cooperate, as discussed in Section 3, so in this 
section we assume that clients always provide feedback. We consider two cases: a low demand case and a 
high demand case. In the first case, a high-capacity GSP might want to downsize because of low demand. 
In the second case, a low-capacity GSP might want to upgrade because of high demand. These two cases 
frequently arise when making capital investment decisions. Table 10 summarizes the default values of 
parameters for the experiments.  
 
Table 10 -- Simulation parameters 
 Parameter Value 
Environment TIME 
Job load 
 
 
 
 
 
Service rate 
518400 minutes (1 year) 
 Low demand (market case 1) 
o Num_clients = 5,000 
o Interarrival rate = 0.3 jobs/min 
 High demand (market case 2) 
o Num_clients = 50,000 
o Interarrival rate = 0.5 jobs/min 
{0.24, 0.40, 0.84, 1.25, 1.62, 2.20} 
Client Agents Budget 
Preferred duration 
No_of_jobs 
QoS threshold (j) 
j 
tretransmit 
P(contribution) 
P(untruthful) 
Uniform (5, 100) 
Uniform (5, 30) 
Uniform (10, 100) 
Uniform (-2,0) 
1.0 
1000 min 
1 
{0, 1.0} 
GSP Agents ai 
bi 
pi (service price)
 
0 
0.1 
Vary based on system utilization 
 
5.4 Case I: Low Demand with Truthful Feedback 
 
In this case, we study whether a GSP6 should downgrade its computing capacity because of low demand. 
Without value profiles, GSP6 produces 274,711 jobs/year and its revenue is below the LATC curve. This 
means that GSP6 loses approximately $5,494, as shown in the small shaded rectangle in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 -- Market equilibrium in Case I 
 
With value profiles, as shown in Fig. 5, GSP6 will profit by reducing its service rate from 2.2 to 0.4 
jobs/min since the equilibrium point is close to GSP2. Fig. 6 summarizes the tradeoffs after downgrading to 
the same capacity as GSP2. The results clearly show that system utilization significantly increases from 
45.7% to 82.5% and the percentage of positive feedback decreases from 99.4% to 94.8%. The clients’ job 
success rate also decreases from 99.3% to 92.5%.  Figure 6(d) clearly shows the tradeoffs when using value 
profiles,. While system utilization increases by 36.8% percentage points, percentage of positive feedback 
and clients’ job success rate decreases by 4.6% and 6.8% percentage points, respectively. In summary, the 
use of value profiles benefits GSP6 in resource cost savings even though client satisfaction rate decreases 
slightly (but remains over 90%). 
 
 
Figure 6 -- Summary of tradeoffs using value profiles in Case I 
  
 Since clients are worse off in this case, they might not want to cooperate with GSP6 or will even 
provide untruthful feedback. This will cause the market demand curve and the equilibrium point to change. 
To investigate this, we changed the values of P(contribution) and P(untruthful) in Table 10. In this 
experiment, each client is randomly assigned with a different probability and observe the outcome. 
 As explained in Section 3.3, GSPs expect to receive positive feedback if they can finish a job within a 
preferred duration. Thus, this expected positive feedback can be used as the reference market demand curve 
when clients are always cooperative, P(contribution) = 1, and truthful, P(untruthful) = 0.  
 With non-cooperative and untruthful clients, the received market demand curve shifts down and to the 
left, as shown in Fig. 7. The result shows that the received and reference equilibrium points are close to 
GSP1 and GSP2, respectively. With the received demand information, GSP6 will downsize to the same 
capacity as GSP1 instead of GSP2. In other words, GSP6 will reduce its service rate from 2.2 to 0.24 
jobs/min, which is a reduction of 1.96 jobs/min. If clients are cooperative, GSP6 will reduce its capacity rate 
to 0.4 jobs/min, which is a reduction of only 1.8 jobs/min. So if clients are non-cooperative and untruthful, 
clients will experience more delays in the system, so they are better off cooperating with GSP6. 
 
 
Figure 7 -- Change in demand curve and equilibrium for Case I 
 
To further investigate the downgrade scenario
17
, we play a non-cooperative game between a GSP and a 
client; this will enable us to study the development of cooperation for this situation. Both the GSP and the 
client have two strategies: Cooperate or Defect. Table 1 shows that the resulting payoff of -Q when 
cooperating is larger than –kQ when defecting. As a result, clients will cooperate with the GSP6 (the 
cooperation will emerge). 
 
Table 11 -- Client's incentive game 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
Cooperate 
 
Defect 
 
Cooperate 
-ωQ 
ωC 
-kQ 
kC 
 
Defect 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
5.5 Case II: Low Demand with Untruthful Feedback 
 
Untruthful feedback might cause the accuracy of percentage of positive feedback to decrease. In this case, 
we examine whether untruthful feedback affects GSP6’s decision in case I. 
 
                                                        
17 See Table 4. 
 
Figure 8 -- Percent positive feedback, Case II vs. Case I 
 
With truthful feedback in case I, positive feedback decreases slightly by 4.6% percentage points after 
GSP6 downsizes its computing capacity to level of GSP2. However, with untruthful feedback, the positive 
feedback decreases from 97.5% to 85.6%, which is a 11.9% decline in percentage points as presented in 
Fig. 8(b). Therefore, untruthful feedback reduces the accuracy of positive feedback by 7.36% percentage 
points.  
If GSP6 can live with this untruthful client satisfaction rate, it will continue using this computing 
capacity (GSP2). On the other hand, if GSP6 prefers to keep its client satisfaction rate over 90%, it might 
decide to upgrade its computing capacity to be the same as GSP3. However, GSP6 will end up with losses 
since revenue of GSP3 is below the LATC curve, as presented in Fig 5. As a consequence, this would not 
happen because GSP6 has to have a profit. Thus, GSP6 will not change its decision for this case. 
5.6 Case III: High Demand with Truthful Feedback 
 
In the high demand case, we examine whether GSP2 should upgrade its computing capacity to generate 
more revenue. Without value profiles, GSP2 produces 186,758 jobs/year and its revenue is clearly over the 
LATC curve. This means that GSP2 has a super normal profit, as shown in the green square in Fig. 9. Note 
that when a firm has a super normal profit, it attracts new entrants to the industry. By increasing its capacity 
to produce more jobs at lower cost, a GSP would achieve economies of scale and reduce the entry 
incentive. Thus, GSP2 must increase its service rate from 0.4 to 1.62 jobs/min since the equilibrium point is 
close to GSP5, as shown in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 -- Market equilibrium in Case III 
 
Figure 10 -- Summary of the tradeoffs when using value profiles in Case III 
 
Fig. 10 summarizes the tradeoffs involved. After upgrading to the same capacity as GSP5, GSP2’s 
system utilization increases from 87% to 92.6%, and percentage of positive feedback goes up from 86.1% 
to 97.2%. Moreover, clients’ job success rate significantly improves from 82.9% to 96.6%. As shown in 
Fig. 10(d), we do not observe the tradeoffs we saw in Case I. The results show that system utilization, 
percentage of positive feedback, and clients’ job success rate increase by 5.6, 11.1, and 13.7 percentage 
points, respectively. In summary, the use of value profiles provides benefits to GSP2 both in terms of 
revenue and client satisfaction rate. Likewise, clients receive the benefit from the use of value profiles since 
their job success rate goes up. 
5.7 Case IV: High Demand with Untruthful Feedback 
 
As in Section 5.5, the purpose of this case is to determine whether untruthful feedback affects GSP2’s 
investment decision in Case III. With truthful feedback in Case III, positive feedback increases by 11.1% 
percentage points after GSP2 upgrades its computing capacity to the same as GSP5. With untruthful 
feedback in this case, positive feedback increases from 70.2% to 90.6%, which is an increase of 20.4 
percentage points as shown in Fig. 11(b). Therefore, untruthful feedback significantly inflates the accuracy 
of positive feedback by 9.18% percentage points. 
 
 
Figure 11 -- Percent positive feedback, Case IV vs. Case III 
 
As this untruthful client satisfaction rate is around 90%, GSP2 will continue to use this computing 
capacity (GSP5). Unless GSP2 requires client satisfaction rate of 95%, it might decide to upgrade its 
computing capacity to be the same as GSP6. In doing so, GSP2 will lose since the revenue of GSP6 is below 
the LATC curve, as shown in Fig. 9.  
6. Conclusion 
 
As the goal of GSPs is to improve their economic viability by maintaining the lowest possible amount of 
resources to meet client demand, they have to know how clients value their services. In this paper, we 
describe how we constructed a value profile using binary feedback for a collection of heterogeneous grid 
clients, which GSPs can use to economically plan their resources. The results show that binary feedback 
can be used to construct a value profile that will serve as a proxy for a demand function to represent client’s 
willingness-to-pay for grid resources at different prices. 
Since clients have incentives to provide untruthful feedback, we use credibility mechanisms to detect 
untruthful feedback and our game analysis shows that a credibility mechanism can help cooperation merge. 
Using the mechanism of the value function, we show that a credibility-based binary feedback can assist 
GSPs in economically planning their resources.  
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